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interventionist judges, thereby protecting the autonomy of administrative decision makers and promoting
deference. Second, it was substantive, rather than formal, and moved the focus of judicial review away from
abstract concepts and towards the eccentricities of statutory schemes. However, in its more recent forays into
the general principles of judicial review, the Court has threatened to reverse its deferential and substantive
course by following a formalistic, categorical approach. In this article I describe the Court’s efforts to reshape
the law of judicial review of administrative action, critique these efforts as favouring a formalistic approach to
judicial review, and suggest that in its haste to simplify the law of judicial review, the Court has jeopardized the
due deference that should be accorded to administrative decision makers: It has erroneously favoured form
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The Unfortunate Triumph of Form over
Substance in Canadian Administrative Law
PAUL DALY *
The standard of review analysis for judicial review of administrative action developed by the
Supreme Court of Canada before Dunsmuir v New Brunswick had two important features.
First, it provided a bulwark against interventionist judges, thereby protecting the autonomy of
administrative decision makers and promoting deference. Second, it was substantive, rather
than formal, and moved the focus of judicial review away from abstract concepts and towards
the eccentricities of statutory schemes. However, in its more recent forays into the general
principles of judicial review, the Court has threatened to reverse its deferential and
substantive course by following a formalistic, categorical approach. In this article I describe
the Court’s efforts to reshape the law of judicial review of administrative action, critique
these efforts as favouring a formalistic approach to judicial review, and suggest that in its
haste to simplify the law of judicial review, the Court has jeopardized the due deference that
should be accorded to administrative decision makers: It has erroneously favoured form over
substance.
Les normes d’analyse élaborées par la Cour suprême du Canada avant Dunsmuir c New
Brunswick pour la révision judicaire des mesures administratives comportaient deux caractéristiques essentielles. Premièrement, elles procuraient un rempart contre les juges
interventionnistes, protégeant ainsi l’autonomie du décideur administratif et favorisant le
devoir de réserve. Deuxièmement, elles donnaient préséance aux faits plutôt qu’aux principes
et recentraient la révision judiciaire des concepts abstraits vers les particularités des lois.
Cependant, dans ses plus récentes incursions dans les principes généraux de la révision
judiciaire, la Cour menace d’inverser son mode d’action réservé et factuel pour le remplacer
par une approche formaliste et catégorique. Dans cet article, je décris les efforts de la Cour
visant à remanier le droit de la révision judiciaire des mesures administratives, je critique ces
efforts qui favorisent selon moi une approche formaliste de la révision judiciaire et je suggère
que dans sa hâte de simplifier le droit de la révision judiciaire, la Cour met en péril son devoir
de réserve envers le législateur et favorise à tort la forme par rapport à la substance.

*

Assistant Professor, Faculté de Droit, Université de Montréal. Thanks, with the usual
disclaimer, to David Dyzenhaus, Matt Lewans and the anonymous reviewers for comments
on a previous draft.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE STANDARD OF REVIEW ANALYSIS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CAN BE DIFFICULT to grasp. Judicial review, comprised

in large part of abstract concepts, has a particularly slippery quality. At a high
level of abstraction, however, it can be understood as the attempt by judges to
allocate authority between the various organs of government found in the modern
administrative state. Allocation requires choice, and choice requires a metric by
which it can be made. When administrative lawyers talk of “error of law,” “grounds
of review,” “jurisdictional error,” and “standard of review analysis,” they are talking
about metrics, sometimes called doctrines. Underlying the choices and metrics—
and even choices of metrics—are public law values refracted through a prism of
judicial attitudes, ideologies, and preferences. But choices and metrics may be limited
by constitutional principles, such as an obligation to give effect to legislative intent,
or provisions like section 96 of the Constitution Act,1 which has been interpreted as
guaranteeing the availability of judicial review of administrative action.2
1.

2.

Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 96, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No
5. The provision mandates that the Governor General appoint the judges of the Superior,
District, and County Courts in each Province, excepting the Courts of Probate in Nova
Scotia and New Brunswick.
Crevier v Québec (Attorney General), [1981] 2 SCR 220, 127 DLR (3d) 1.
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A deferential attitude will manifest itself in doctrines that give a degree of
latitude to administrative decision makers; but an attitude of judicial supremacy
will be accompanied by doctrines that tend to constrain administrative decision
makers. Once this is understood, one way of conceptualizing judicial review in
very broad terms is to visualize judicial attitudes as something of a pendulum,
capable of swinging from deference on the one side to judicial supremacy on the
other.3 Note, though, that while one can accept the metaphor of the pendulum,
one can also think that it ought to be frozen in a particular place. Certainly,
I think that the pendulum should swing no longer and come to rest on the
deferential side.4
In the early 1970s in the common law world, the pendulum had swung
towards judicial supremacy. In its seminal decision in Anisminic,5 the House
of Lords effectively jettisoned the possibility of intra-jurisdictional errors of
law. Henceforth, any error of law committed by an administrative decision
maker constituted a jurisdictional error which could be corrected on judicial
review,6 even in the presence of a statutory provision purporting to exclude any
review of the decision maker’s decision. The old orthodoxy that errors of law
could be made “within jurisdiction,” and thus not be open to correction by a
reviewing court, was no more. A move towards judicial supremacy had already
been made by the resurrection of the doctrine of “error of law on the face of the
record,”7 whereby errors of law that appeared in the written disposition were
open to correction, but Anisminic made the shift conclusive. In Metropolitan Life
Insurance v International Union of Operating Engineers,8 the Supreme Court of
Canada followed suit without offering any analysis to support its decision to do
so, even in the face of a statutory provision purporting to oust judicial review. In
3.
4.

5.
6.

7.
8.

For an earlier use of the metaphor, see Andrew J Roman, “The Pendulum Swings Back: Case
Comment WW Lester (1978) Ltd v UA, Local 740” (1991) 48:1 Admin LR 274.
Paul Daly, “Deference on Questions of Law” (2011) 74:5 Mod L Rev 694; Paul Daly, A
Theory of Deference in Administrative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)
[Daly, Theory of Deference].
Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 2 AC 147, 2 WLR 163 (HL) [Anisminic].
This is a general rule, subject to some limited exceptions. See In re Racal Communications Ltd,
[1981] AC 374 at 383-384, (1980) 3 WLR 181; R v Hull University Visitor, ex parte Page,
[1993] AC 682 at 693-95, [1993] 1 All ER 97; R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission,
ex parte South Yorkshire Transport, [1993] 1 WLR 23 [Monopolies and Mergers Commission].
Monopolies and Mergers Commission may also be an authority for a limited exception, but its
extent is very much a matter of uncertainty. See e.g. Paul Craig, Administrative Law 6th ed
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2008) at 467-70.
R v Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shaw, [1952] 1 KB 338 at 352,
1 All ER 122.
[1970] SCR 425, 11 DLR (3d) 336 [Metropolitan].
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Bell v Ontario (Human Rights Commission),9 the Court confirmed the existence
of a distinction between jurisdictional errors and non-jurisdictional errors, with
the former rendering any afflicted decision unlawful, even in situations where a
final decision had not yet been taken.
There were two problems with this approach. First, it relied on formalistic
distinctions between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors, as well as
distinctions between errors of law and other errors. Abstract categories were
developed and applied without regard to the subject matter under review. No
attention was paid to the intricacies of the underlying statutory scheme (including
the characteristics of the decision maker and its decision-making process) that
the legislature had established and that the administrative decision maker had
interpreted:
Formalism is formal in that it requires judges to operate with categories and
distinctions that determine results without the judges having to deploy the
substantive arguments that underpin the categories and distinctions. Since those
categories and distinctions must take on a life of their own in order to operate in
this detached way, they are capable of determining results that contradict the very
arguments for these categories and distinctions.10

Second, the approach was not deferential. It manifested an attitude of
hostility towards administrative decision makers. One can speculate that
common law judges remained in thrall to Dicey and considered themselves
to be bulwarks against Leviathan,11 or that legal practice’s constant search for
the best answer to distinctively legal questions coloured the judicial attitude
to reviewing errors of law.12
Whatever the reason, the Court’s administrative law jurisprudence in the
1960s and 1970s provoked some strong criticism,13 and the leading academics
9. [1971] SCR 756, 18 DLR (3d) 1 [Bell].
10. David Dyzenhaus, “Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in Administrative
Law” (2002) 27:2 Queen’s LJ 445 at 450.
11. See Ian Holloway, “‘A Bona Fide Attempt’: Chief Justice Sir Owen Dixon and the Policy of
Deference to Administrative Expertise in the High Court of Australia” (2002) 54:2 Admin L
Rev 687 at 698. This attitude is still prevalent. See e.g. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans) v David
Suzuki Foundation, 2012 FCA 40 at paras 71-76 (available on CanLII).
12. See generally, Luc Tremblay, “La norme de retenue judiciaire et les ‘erreurs de droit’ en
droit administratif: une erreur de droit? Au delà du fondationalisme et du scepticism”
(1996) 56:2 R du B 141.
13. See e.g. HW Arthurs, “Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business” (1979) 17:1
Osgoode Hall LJ 1; PW Hogg, “The Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine in the Supreme Court of
Canada: Bell v. Ontario Human Rights Commission” (1971) 9:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 203 [Hogg,
“Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine”]; PW Hogg, “Judicial Review: How Much Do We Need?”
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of the day counselled a deferential approach.14 Although the Court’s record was
not roundly condemned,15 Justice Wilson, looking back, saw evidence of
a lack of sympathy for the proposition that if administrative tribunals are to function
effectively and efficiently, then we must recognise (1) that their decisions are crafted
by those with specialized knowledge of the subject matter before them; and (2)
that there is value in limiting the extent to which their decisions may be frustrated
through an expansive judicial review.16

Thus, by the end of the 1970s, there was some impetus for a deferential
approach. The New Brunswick Liquor case17 is “commonly considered the starting
point for the acceptance of the notion of deference in Canadian administrative
law and of its importance in framing the law of judicial review.”18 In two
important ways, Justice Dickson set Canadian law on a deferential course. First,
he admonished reviewing courts “not [to] be alert to brand as jurisdictional,
and therefore subject to broader curial review, that which may be doubtfully
so.”19 Second, he held that an interpretation of law by an expert tribunal, made
within its jurisdiction, could only be quashed by a court if the interpretation was
patently unreasonable.20
The development of what came to be called the “standard of review” 21 analysis
gathered momentum in the 1980s22 and 1990s.23 By the time of its decision in

14.

15.

16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

23.

(1974) 20:2 McGill LJ 157; Paul Weiler, “The ‘Slippery Slope’ of Judicial Intervention: The
Supreme Court and Canadian Labour Relations 1950-1970” (1971) 9:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1.
John Willis, “Canadian Administrative Law in Retrospect” (1974) 24:2 UTLJ 225 at 244-46;
DJ Mullan, “The Federal Court Act: A Misguided Attempt at Administrative Law Reform?”
(1973) 23:1 UTLJ 14 at 36-43.
PW Hogg, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Administrative Law, 1949-1971” (1973)
11:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 187; David Mullan, “The Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine in the Supreme
Court of Canada – A Mitigating Plea” (1972) 10:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 440.
National Corn Growers Association v Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 SCR 1324 at para
8, 74 DLR (4th) 449. See also JM Evans, “Developments in Administrative Law: The 1984-85
Term” (1986) 8:1 Sup Ct L Rev 1 at 27-28.
Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v New Brunswick Liquor Corporation, [1979]
2 SCR 227, 25 NBR (2d) 327 [New Brunswick Liquor cited to SCR].
The Honourable Mr. Justice Louis LeBel, “Some Properly Deferential Thoughts on
Deference” (2008) 21:1 Can J Admin L & P 1 at 2.
New Brunswick Liquor, supra note 17 at 233.
Ibid at 237.
Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 63, 1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir].
Syndicat des employés de production du Québec et de l’Acadie v Canada Labour Relations Board and
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, [1984] 2 SCR 412, 14 DLR (4th) 457 [Canada Labour Relations
Board]; Union des employés de service, local 298 v Bibeault, [1988] 2 SCR 1048, 95 NR 161 [Bibeault].
Pezim v British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 SCR 557, 114 DLR (4th)

322

(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

Pushpanathan,24 the Court had refined this approach into a four-factor inquiry
considering: (1) whether a privative clause protected the decision, or conversely,
a right of appeal was provided for; (2) the expertise of the decision maker, relative
to the reviewing court and relative to the decision under review; (3) the purpose
of the decision maker as determined by a consideration of the parent statute;
and (4) the nature of the decision, whether closer to law and more suited to
judicial oversight, or closer to fact and thus demanding deference. Depending on
the interplay of the four factors, one of three standards of review was to apply:
correctness, which entitled the reviewing court to “undertake its own reasoning
process to arrive at the result it judges correct”;25 reasonableness simpliciter,
which required the reviewing court to test the impugned decision to ascertain
whether it could withstand a “somewhat probing examination”;26 and patent
unreasonableness, which required the reviewing court to affirm the decision
unless it was “so patently unreasonable that [it] cannot be rationally supported
by the relevant legislation and demands intervention by the court upon review.”27
The standards of review themselves formed something of a spectrum, ranging
from correctness at the most interventionist point and patent unreasonableness
at the most deferential.
The standard of review analysis had two important features. First, it provided
something of a bulwark against interventionist judges. It is harder to go through
a four-factor analysis and conclude that correctness is the appropriate standard of
review than it is to classify a question as one of jurisdiction or law and thus apt
for judicial intervention, effectively on a standard of review of correctness. Four
steps are greater than one. I do not mean to suggest that the four-factor analysis
presented an insurmountable hurdle. Doctrine can only do so much, and it is
always open to subversion.28 But the standard of review analysis made it harder to

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

385; Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Southam Inc, [1997] 1 SCR 748, 144
DLR (4th) 1 [Southam cited to SCR].
Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister for Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 SCR 982, 160
DLR (4th) 193 [Pushpanathan cited to SCR].
Law Society of New Brunswick v Ryan, 2003 SCC 20 at para 50, 1 SCR 247, Iacobucci J.
Southam, supra note 23 at para 56 Iacobucci J.
New Brunswick Liquor, supra note 17 at 237, Dickson J.
See e.g. Grant Huscroft, “Judicial Review from CUPE to CUPE: Less is Not Always
More” in Grant Huscroft & Michael Taggart, eds, Inside and Outside Canadian
Administrative Law: Essays in Honour of David Mullan (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2006) 296; Gabrielle Perrault, Le contrôle judiciaire des decisions de
l’Administration: de l’erreur juridictionnelle à la norme de contrôle (Montréal: Wilson
and Lafleur, 2002) at 100-04; Christopher Taylor, “Curial Deference and Judicial
Review” (1991) 13:1 Advocates’ Q 78; Mark Walters, “Jurisdiction, Functionalism, and
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justify intervention. It is not surprising that the New Brunswick Liquor decision
has been described as having “marked the Court’s acceptance of the legitimacy of
the administrative state.”29
Second, the standard of review analysis was more substantive than it was
formal. It was concerned with the intricacies of the statutory scheme rather than
abstract concepts such as jurisdiction and error of law.30 In stark contrast to the
formalistic distinctions that it replaced, the standard of review analysis required
determinations of the appropriate intensity of judicial review to be “made on a
case-by-case basis”31 in a manner “realistically cognizant of the institutional realities
of the administrative state.”32 In this sense, it was unrelentingly substantive:
Conceptual and abstract ways of thinking about law and legal problems have given
way to an approach that pays more attention to the social, economic, and political
contexts from which the issues arise, and to the likely consequences of resolving
them one way rather than another, both for the immediately concerned litigants and
for the wider public interests.33

Moreover, the “central inquiry” of the standard of review analysis was into
legislative intent.34 On examining the substance of the statute establishing the

29.

30.

31.
32.
33.

34.

Constitutionalism in Canadian Administrative Law” in Christopher Forsyth et al, eds,
Effective Judicial Review: A Cornerstone of Good Governance (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010) 300 at 307.
David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent, “Rethinking the Process-Substance Distinction:
Baker v Canada” (2001) 51:3 UTLJ 193 at 200. However, “Judges remained at the apex
of the interpretive hierarchy, with some accommodation made for the phenomenon of
administrative decision making.” Ibid at 203.
I do not claim that the standard of review analysis was entirely substantive. For example, the
‘nature of the question’ factor is just as formal as the concept of error of law; however, its
relegation to a single factor rather than an organizing principle of judicial review pushed the
standard of review analysis away from substance and towards form.
Ontario (Attorney General) v Ontario Public Service Employees Union (2000), 52 OR (3d) 77
at para 33, 195 DLR (4th) 376 (CA), Moldaver JA.
Robert Leckey, “Territoriality in Canadian Administrative Law” (2004) 54:3 UTLJ 327 at
362.
John M Evans & Trevor Knight, “Cory on Administrative Law: A Contextual Study” in
Patrick J Monahan & Sandra A Forbes, eds, Peter Cory at the Supreme Court of Canada:
1989-1999 (Winnipeg: Canadian Legal History Project, 2001) 71 at 72.
Pushpanathan, supra note 24 at para 26, Bastarache J. This was largely, though not entirely,
accurate. The “nature of the question” factor, for example, must be detached from legislative
intent because there is no compelling basis from which to infer that legislators intend to
delegate legal questions to courts or factual questions to administrative decision makers.
Rather, for legitimacy, this factor must rely on a background assumption about the propriety
of courts, as opposed to administrators, answering questions of law.
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decision maker and the provisions the decision maker had interpreted, a reviewing
court could determine in a rough sense the intended relationship between the
court and the decision maker. A link to legislative intent was capable of providing
the standard of review analysis with a theoretical footing much firmer than any
available to the formalistic distinctions relied upon previously.35
However, in its more recent forays into the general principles of judicial
review, the Court has threatened to reverse its deferential and substantive course
by substituting a formalistic, categorical approach for a contextual, case-by-case
analysis. In this article, I will describe the Court’s efforts to reshape the law of
judicial review of administrative action; I will critique these efforts on the basis that
the formal, categorical approach is not soundly based, is not coherent, and leads
to conflict between the prescribed categories; I will argue that key questions about
the new, unified standard of reasonableness have been inadequately answered; and
I will suggest that in its haste to simplify the law of judicial review, the Court has
jeopardized the due deference that should be accorded to administrative decision
makers and has erroneously favoured form over substance. The problems with
the new approach bode ill for the lower courts, lawyers, and litigants tasked with
following it. For this reason, the problems ought to be highlighted, and the Court
ought to be encouraged to change its course.

II. THE CONFUSION OF DUNSMUIR: PRESUMPTIONS,
CATEGORIES, AND FACTORS
Theoretical consistency had, to some extent, been achieved by the early years
of the twenty-first century. However, it came at the expense of practical
understanding: It was said that the standard of review analysis provides “great
flexibility but little real on-the-ground guidance, and offers too many standards
of review.”36 As a Federal Court judge complained:
As is becoming increasingly common in administrative law cases, a prodigious
amount of time was spent by the parties, at both the hearing before me and in
their written submissions, regarding the correct standard of review to be applied.
35. Daly, Theory of Deference, supra note 4, ch 2.
36. Dusmuir, supra note 21 at para 43, Bastarache and LeBel JJ. For criticism from judges
charged with applying the standard of review analysis, see e.g. Calgary Health Region v United
Nurses of Alberta, Local 95, 2005 ABQB 893 at para 20, 55 Alta LR (4th) 284; Currie v
Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2006 FCA 194 at paras 20-23, [2007] 1 FCR 471;
Miller v Newfoundland (Workers’ Compensation Commission) (1997) 154 Nfld and PEIR 52
(Nfld SC (TD)); Poulin c Centre hospitalier Anna Laberge, [2004] JQ No 4237 (CS).
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Although counsel did an admirable job of analysing the jurisprudence in order
to delineate the fine and often obscure nuances between the concepts of patent
unreasonableness and reasonableness simpliciter, it is obvious that what has
developed in this field of law is an unwieldy framework which is unnecessarily
complex and difficult to apply.37

For the Court, this was too high a price to pay, and it adopted the opportunity
presented by Dunsmuir v New Brunswick to reshape Canadian administrative law.
In the first paragraph of their majority reasons, Justices Bastarache and LeBel
explained that the Court considered it necessary to develop solutions that could
“provide real guidance for litigants, counsel, administrative decision makers or
judicial review judges.”38 In his concurring reasons, Justice Binnie identified
“afoot in the legal profession a desire for clearer guidance than is provided by
lists of principles, factors and spectrums.”39 The standard of review analysis
had drawbacks, chief among them being significant “predecision costs”;40 the
reviewing court had to spend a significant amount of time focusing on matters
that are, from a litigant’s point of view, quite arcane.41
Accordingly, the Court implemented changes at both stages of the standard of
review analysis. First, in determining the appropriate standard of review, the Court
held that an “exhaustive review” of the standard of review analysis factors would not
be “required in every case.”42 In particular, where previous jurisprudence indicated the
appropriate standard of review, a full analysis would be unnecessary since “the analysis
required is already deemed to have been performed and need not be repeated.”43 But
also, the Court noted, it would not “be necessary to consider all of the factors, as some
of them may be determinative in the application of the reasonableness standard in a
specific case.”44 Second, the Court held that the number of available standards should
be reduced from three to two: “[T]he two variants of reasonableness review should
be collapsed into a single form of ‘reasonableness’ review. The result is a system of
judicial review comprising two standards—correctness and reasonableness.”45 In what
37. Mountain Parks Watershed Assn v Chateau Lake Louise Corp, 2004 FC 1222 at para 11, 263
FTR 12, Rouleau J.
38. Dunsmuir, supra note 21 at para 1.
39. Ibid at para 132.
40. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal
Interpretation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).
41. Dunsmuir, supra note 21 at para 133, Binnie J.
42. Ibid at para 57.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid at para 64.
45. Ibid at para 45.
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follows, I will concentrate on the Court’s reshaping of the first stage, but afterwards I
will return to the unified reasonableness standard.
Peppered throughout the Court’s discussion in Dunsmuir of how reviewing
courts should determine the appropriate standard of review are references to
certain shortcuts or presumptions that should be borne in mind. For example, the
presence of a privative clause would be a “strong indication of review pursuant to
the reasonableness standard”;46 it was also said that “[d]eference will usually result
where a tribunal is interpreting its own statute or statutes closely connected to
its function, with which it will have particular familiarity.”47 On the correctness
side of the ledger, the Court noted that previous jurisprudence had established
that correctness would be the appropriate standard of review for several types of
questions, namely constitutional questions,48 “true questions of jurisdiction,”49
questions of general law,50 and those involving overlaps between different decision
makers’ jurisdictions.51 Nevertheless, the Court expressly retained the four factors
that comprised the standard of review analysis52 and even applied them to the
facts of Dunsmuir.53
That there was some conceptual confusion underlying the Court’s analysis is
suggested by its infelicitous observation that where a question of “fact, discretion
or policy” is subject to review, “deference will usually apply automatically.”54 It
is worth pausing for a moment to consider the linguistic wonder that is ‘the
thing that usually happens automatically.’ A sliding door that usually opens
automatically is likely to lead to puzzled pedestrians at best and bruised noses
at worst. A company that usually deposits paychecks automatically is unlikely to
gain the trust of its employees. At least with respect to this category of decision,
it is entirely unclear what the Court was trying to say.
This linguistic problem points to deeper problems with Dunsmuir. At the
same time as it purported to establish presumptive categories to which either
reasonableness or correctness would be appropriately applied, the Court
maintained the four-factor standard of review analysis. It used the words “usually”

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Ibid at para 52.
Ibid at para 54.
Ibid at para 58.
Ibid at para 59.
Ibid at para 60.
Ibid at para 61.
Ibid at para 64.
Ibid at paras 66-71.
Ibid at para 53.
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and “generally” on several occasions.55 It gave no guidance as to when the
presumptions would be rebutted or displaced or what weight the presumptions
should be given, which is problematic for reasons recently expressed by Justice
Cromwell: “Creating a presumption without providing guidance on how one
could tell whether it has been rebutted does not, in my respectful view, provide
any assistance to reviewing courts.”56 The Court also gave no guidance on
the order in which a reviewing court should proceed. Should it consider the
presumptions first and then the four factors? Or should it consider the four
factors first and then the presumptions? On first sight, the second formulation
might seem at odds with the Court’s overall approach, but there is a logic
to it. The four-factor standard of review analysis would be applied, but if it
produced an anomalous result, reference to the presumptions would correct
the anomaly. In some anomalous case, the four-factor analysis might suggest
correctness, even in respect of a fact-laden decision, but the presumption that
factual determinations attract deference would counsel reasonableness.57 This
lack of clarity is troubling and indicative of a Court that may not truly know
its own mind.58

55. Ibid at paras 51, 53-54, 57.
56. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61
at para 92, 3 SCR 654 [Alberta Teachers’ Association].
57. See e.g. Dr Q v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, 2003 SCC 19, 1
SCR 226. In the Court’s view, three of the standard of review analysis factors pointed to
correctness and only one towards deference. There, the standard of reasonableness simpliciter
was available. Post-Dunsmuir, the four-factor analysis would at least point towards review on
a correctness standard, but this may not be sufficient to rebut the presumption of deference.
58. A further lack of clarity is revealed by the ongoing uncertainty about Dunsmuir’s applicability
to non-adjudicative decision makers. See e.g. Globalive Wireless Management Corp v Public
Mobile Inc, 2011 FCA 194 at para 35, 3 FCR 344 [Globalive]; Toussaint v Canada (Attorney
General), 2011 FCA 213 at para 19, FCJ No 984 (QL); Georgia Strait Alliance v Canada
(Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), 2012 FCA 40 at paras 83-100, FCJ No 157 (QL);
Mamnuni v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 FC 736 at
para 33, FCJ No 1108 (QL). The Court has continued to assume the applicability of the
unified approach established in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1999] 2 SCR 817, SCJ No 39 (QL) [Baker]. According to this approach, all decision
makers exercising statutory powers are subject to the same general principles of judicial
review. See e.g. Catalyst Paper Corp v North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2 at paras 12-13,
1 SCR 5 [Catalyst]. I assume unity in what follows, with the caveat that the Court’s future
decisions will have to be watched and parsed closely to vindicate or defeat the accuracy of my
assumption.
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III. THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH SOLIDIFIED
While the Court is still guilty of equivocating in its recent decisions,59 it seems to
have pinned its colours firmly to the mast of the categorical approach. In doing
so, the Court has dashed the hopes of those who viewed Dunsmuir as offering
“relatively modest adjustments”60 or a lexical rather than conceptual contribution
to the administrative law oeuvre.61 Justice Fish, writing for the majority in Smith v
Alliance Pipeline, explained the “analytical framework”62 established by Dunsmuir
in the following terms. Correctness applies to: (1) constitutional issues; (2)
questions of general law both of central importance to the legal system as a whole
and outside the adjudicator’s specialized area of expertise; (3) the drawing of
jurisdictional lines between two or more competing specialized tribunals; and (4)
true questions of jurisdiction or vires. Reasonableness is normally the governing
standard where the question at issue: (1) relates to the interpretation of the
tribunal’s home statute or statutes closely connected to its function with which
it will have particular familiarity; (2) raises issues of fact, discretion, or policy; or
(3) involves inextricably intertwined legal and factual issues.63
Judging by the use of the word “normally” to describe the categories in
respect of which reasonableness should be the “governing standard,”64 the Court
is still equivocating somewhat. Indeed, the categories are also described as “nonexhaustive,”65 and the standard of review factors remain as “guideposts.”66
Further equivocal language can be found in respect of the categorical
approach. Justice Fish commented in Alliance Pipeline that judges can “usefully
begin their analysis” by ascertaining the appropriate category. He went on to

59. Smith v Alliance Pipeline, 2011 SCC 7, 1 SCR 160 [Alliance Pipeline]; Canada (Canadian
Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 53, 3 SCR 471
[Canadian Human Rights Commission]; Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc v Manitoba
Association of Health Care Professionals, 2011 SCC 59, 3 SCR 616 [Nor-Man]; Alberta
Teachers’ Association, supra note 56.
60. Walters, supra note 28 at 308.
61. “Aussi suis-je enclin à penser que Dunsmuir n’est qu’une péripétie de moindre importance,
une contribution lexicale plutôt que conceptuelle au droit administratif canadien, et assez
peu de choses à côté de l’arrêt SCFP.” Yves-Marie Morissette, “Rétrospective et Prospective
sur le Contentieux Administratif ” (2008-2009) 39:1 RDUS 1 at 15.
62. Alliance Pipeline, supra note 59 at para 27. See similarly Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 56.
63. Alliance Pipeline, ibid at para 26.
64. Nor-Man, supra note 59 at para 37.
65. Ibid at para 25.
66. Nor-Man, supra note 59 at para 41.
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note that “the first step will suffice ... in this case”67—not, by implication, in all
cases. But this equivocal language aside, the message of Alliance Pipeline and its
confrères is clear: Reviewing courts should approach the task of judicial review
by reference to a categorical approach. The first, and usually decisive, step will
be to categorize the question at issue. Categorization, rather than a four-factor
analysis, will determine the applicable standard of review. If it once were possible
to say that Dunsmuir is “Pushpanathan in party dress,”68 it is no longer the case.
Indeed, Justice Fish’s analysis in Alliance Pipeline focused on the categories into
which the questions at issue fell, concluding first that “all fall within categories
which according to Dunsmuir generally attract the standard of reasonableness,”69
and second that “[c]onversely, it is clear that this case does not fall within any
of the categories which, under Dunsmuir, attract a standard of correctness.”70
Moreover, the Court has purported to apply the categorical approach consistently
in its recent decisions. For example, in Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc
v Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals,71 the decision of a labour
arbitrator was said to involve questions of fact, policy, and discretion for which
a standard of review of reasonableness would be appropriate. In both Alberta
(Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association72 and
Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General),73
a reasonableness standard was also applied, ostensibly on the basis that the
decisions at issue involved interpretations of the decision makers’ home statutes.74
Categories can quite often be malleable. One striking difference between
Dunsmuir and Alliance Pipeline is the breadth of the “general questions of law”
category in the latter. In Dunsmuir, Justices Bastarache and LeBel described the
category in the following terms:
[C]ourts must also continue to substitute their own view of the correct answer
where the question at issue is one of general law “that is both of central importance
to the legal system as a whole and outside the adjudicator’s specialized area of
expertise.” Because of their impact on the administration of justice as a whole, such
questions require uniform and consistent answers. Such was the case in Toronto
(City) v. CUPE, which dealt with complex common law rules and conflicting

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Alliance Pipeline, supra note 59 at para 25 [emphasis added].
Hudson Janisch, “Something Old, Something New” (2010) 23:3 Can J Admin L & P 219.
Alliance Pipeline, supra note 59 at para 33.
Ibid at para 34.
Nor-Man, supra note 59.
Supra note 56.
Supra note 59.
I use the words “purported” and “ostensibly” advisedly.
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jurisprudence on the doctrines of res judicata and abuse of process — issues that are
at the heart of the administration of justice.75

To fit into this category, an issue must be (1) a question of general law; (2)
of central importance to the legal system as a whole; (3) of such importance
because of its impact on the administration of justice as a whole; and (4)
outside the decision maker’s expertise.76 In Alliance Pipeline, the third criterion
was dropped. The category is now much broader.77 The examples given in
Dunsmuir—res judicata and abuse of process—might be roughly described
as procedural questions of wide importance, often for other areas of the legal
system, on which administrators lack expertise relative to courts.78 Moreover, if
the examples were intended as exemplars of the category, then the category was
quite narrow. But by removing the requirement that the question raise issues
relating to the administration of justice the Court has increased the scope of one
of the correctness categories. The ease with which the Dunsmuir limitation was
airbrushed out of judicial review doctrine is troubling.
Finally, it is striking that there is no similar equivocal language in respect
of the correctness categories. This should be troubling for those who believe
in deference. Some indeterminate factors might pull a decision from the
reasonableness category into the correctness category, but there are no factors
pulling in the opposite direction. In Dunsmuir and subsequently, the Court has
mandated one-way traffic from reasonableness to correctness.
Having mapped out the terrain, I will argue in the following sections that
the categories are unclear, that they are both over- and under-inclusive, and that
they conflict. Confusion for lower-court judges, counsel, and litigants will be the
unfortunate by-product of the formal approach preferred by the Court.

IV. ARE THE CATEGORIES SOUNDLY BASED?
If it is thought desirable to follow a categorical approach, then the categories
must have sound bases. As Justice Deschamps, the only member of the Court
not to join Justice Fish’s majority in Alliance Pipeline, rightly protested: “[T]he
75. Supra note 21 at para 60 [internal citation omitted].
76. See also the characterization of this category by the Québec Court of Appeal in Syndicat
du personnel technique et professionnel de la Société des alcools du Québec (SPTP) c Société des
alcools du Québec, 2011 QCCA 1642 at para 70 Bich JA [Syndicat du personnel technique].
77. See also Binnie J’s wider-still conception of the category in his concurring reasons in Alberta
Teachers’ Association, supra note 56 at para 84.
78. See Gerald Heckman, “Nor-Man Regional Health Authority: Labour Arbitration, Questions
of General Law and the Challenges of Legal Centrism” (2011) 35:1 Man LJ 63 at 72-73.
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development of any category of question that would tend to eliminate the need
for a more fulsome analysis of the standard of review has to be grounded in a
defensible rationale.”79 As I shall suggest, what are ostensibly neat distinctions
between law, fact, and mixed law and fact turn out on proper examination
neither to be neat nor based on a defensible rationale.80 Moreover, the reliance
on a category of jurisdictional questions is extremely dubious. On the surface,
the categories may look clear, but I will argue that any appearance of clarity is
deceptive.
A.

LAW, FACT, AND MIXED LAW AND FACT81

One should not be too quick to label a question one of “law.” Proper characterization
requires an appreciation of the nuances of the decision under review and the
decision-making process that produced it. Consider the decision of the Court in
Metropolitan Life Insurance v International Union of Operating Engineers,82 the “high
water mark of activist” judicial review of administrative action in Canada.83 At issue
here was section 7(3) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act,84 which, inter alia, allowed
the Labour Relations Board to certify a trade union as a bargaining agent if the Board
were satisfied that more than fifty-five percent of the employees were “members of the
trade union.” The applicant company sought certiorari of a certification decision on the
basis that its employees were not “members” of the respondent trade union within the
meaning of the trade union’s constitution. For its part, the Board had developed a policy
whereby it assessed whether employees were members of a trade union by reference to
a number of factors. The Court held that the Board had committed a reviewable error
of law:
In proceeding in this manner the Board has failed to deal with the question remitted
to it (i.e. whether the employees in question were members of the union at the relevant
date) and instead has decided a question which was not remitted to it (i.e. whether in
regard to those employees there has been fulfilment of the conditions stated above).85

79. Alliance Pipeline, supra note 59 at para 92.
80. I address the absence of a defensible rationale in more detail elsewhere. See Daly, Theory of
Deference, supra note 4, ch 6 at 220ff.
81. This section draws heavily on and revises for a Canadian audience arguments I first formulated
in Daly, “Deference on Questions of Law,” supra note 4 at 701-06 and Daly, ibid at 238-43.
82. Metropolitan, supra note 8.
83. JM Evans et al, Administrative Law: Cases, Text, and Materials 3d ed (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 1989) at 565.
84. RSO 1960, c 202.
85. Metropolitan, supra note 8 at 435.
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In other words, the Court characterized the phrase “members of the
trade union” as meaning members within the definition of the trade union’s
constitution. It was, in the Court’s view, a neat question of law: It appeared in
a statutory provision (without further definition) and lent itself to an ordinary
interpretation.
But the policy the Board had developed casts some doubt on whether the
meaning of “members of the trade union” was such a neat question of law after
all. As the Board explained in its decision, “what the Board is concerned with
is whether the union accords all such employees full rights and privileges as
members.”86 It did not just rely on the formal definitions laid out in the trade
union’s constitution; rather, it conducted a context-sensitive inquiry. The inquiry
was sensitive both to the circumstances of the group of employees and also to
labour relations policy more generally, being particularly alert to the prospect
that formal membership might not represent a trade union’s actual level of
support. In other words, the decision was one of mixed law and fact. Critically,
there was no a priori reason for the Court to treat the phrase “members of the
trade union” as presenting a question of law in some abstract sense. It was not a
neat legal question since it required a sensitive evaluation of facts and policy.87
Rather than fitting neatly into a pre-determined category of “law,” the question
at issue in Metropolitan Life is better categorized as one of mixed law and fact.
More than that, the example demonstrates the folly of relying solely on a
categorical analysis. A reviewing court applying a standard of review analysis to
the impugned certification decision would have had to assess the nature of the
question, to be sure, but that would have been only one of the factors taken into
account in calibrating the standard of review and would not have been decisive
in and of itself.
It is undeniable that questions of law will sometimes be obviously so, and by their
nature will be “easily separable from the undisputed facts of the case … .”88 As I have
suggested elsewhere, the choice of the relevant legal norm—statute, regulation, or
guideline—and the decision to construe it can be considered questions of law, at least
at a high level of generality.89 Selecting and developing the relevant legal definitions
from the norm in question may also be questions of law.90 Having reflected on the
example of the Metropolitan Life case, however, one should doubt that questions of
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Ibid at 429.
See e.g. Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Hoelke, 2011 NSCA 96 at paras 11-18, 308 NSR (2d) 277.
Pushpanathan, supra note 24 at para 47, Bastarache J.
Paul Daly, “Judicial Review of Errors of Law in Ireland” (2006) 41 Irish Jurist 60.
See e.g. Anisminic, supra note 5.
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law will regularly be obvious. Such considerations underpinned the warning given
by Justice Abella in Lévis (City) v Fraternité des policiers de Lévis:91 “[L]egal issues
ought not to be declared readily extricable when they are legitimately and necessarily
intertwined with the adjudicator’s mandate and expertise.”92
Strategies can be employed to try to make questions of law obvious and
apparent. For example, in Metropolitan Life, the Court could be said to have
disposed of the narrow question of whether the board could take into account
factors other than membership within the formal terms of the trade union’s
constitution. Here, to recall, the Court’s answer was “no.” This is a tantalizing
avoidance strategy. Reformulated, the question is indeed narrower than the
meaning of the phrase “members of the trade union.” However attractive its
siren song, the strategy is flawed because it does not account for the existence
of “questions of degree.”93 Where a legal definition is in substance a question
of degree, the factors legitimately taken into account may have a “quality of
continuous variation”94 or consist of “two or more relevant factors”95 of variable
weight. This was the case in respect of the phrase at issue in Metropolitan Life.
Treating one factor as critical blinded the Court to the existence of a question
of degree, pursuant to which it was up to the decision maker to decide whether
factors additional to formal membership should be taken into account. While
clever, the Court’s avoidance strategy was improper.
A more honest strategy would be to identify questions of law by a process of
elimination. One could say that there are three categories of question: law, fact
(including inferences of fact), and mixed law and fact.96 A fact can be defined
as “[an] assertion that a phenomenon has happened or is or will be happening
independent of or anterior to any assertion as to its legal effect.”97 As for inferences
of fact, one recalls Jaffe’s memorable phrase, “If the annual rate of depreciation
of assets of a billion-dollar corporation is a ‘fact’, it is nevertheless a very different
kind of fact from the bigness of Cyrano’s nose.”98 Once the facts have been

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

2007 SCC 14, 1 SCR 591.
Ibid at para 112.
WA Wilson, “Questions of Degree” (1969) 32:4 Mod L Rev 361.
Ibid at 365.
Ibid at 368.
A categorization relied upon by the Court in the context of appellate review. See Housen v
Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, 2 SCR 235 at para 7. See also CT Emery & B Smythe, “Error of
Law in Administrative Law” (1984) 100 Law Q Rev 612 at 614-15.
97. Louis L Jaffe, “Judicial Review: Question of Law” (1955) 69:2 Harv L Rev 239 at 241.
98. Louis L Jaffe, “Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact” (1957) 70:6 Harv L
Rev 953 at 979.
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ascertained, the decision maker must determine if they satisfy the relevant legal
norm that “[e]very exercise of regulatory powers, even where there is no legal
dispute, involves the application of law to facts, a process which requires the
exercise of reasoning powers.”99 These questions of mixed law and fact constitute
a grey area between questions of fact and questions of law. Following this strategy,
a question could be said to be one of law if it were not one of fact or mixed law
and fact.
This alternative approach has the merit of being honest, but it too is
flawed because the distinction between law, fact, and mixed law and fact
cannot withstand scrutiny. Consider the interaction between “law” and “fact,”
for example. While I do not doubt that there are questions that are clearly
factual in nature, or that clearly involve an exercise of fact-finding powers or
functions, the boundaries between fact and law are not so clear as to justify the
creation of hermetically-sealed compartments. In determining the meaning of a
statutory provision, assessments of the facts presented by a particular case will
invariably influence the decision maker: “[I]l arrive … que la compréhension
initiale que l’on a d’une règle se nuance à la lumière de la preuve, ce qui ouvre
la possibilité d’une interprétation nouvelle de la règle.”100 A good example is R
v Skoke-Graham.101 At issue here was the predecessor to section 176(3) of the
Criminal Code, pursuant to which it is an offence to “wilfully [do] anything that
disturbs the order or solemnity” of a religious gathering.102 The appellants were
convicted, having conducted a dignified protest against a Catholic Church policy
that communion wafers should be distributed only to standing service-goers, not
to those kneeling. Of interest for present purposes is the interpretive route that
Chief Justice Dickson took in narrowing the scope of the provision such that the
appellants’ activity did not fall within the section:
If “disturb” ... is taken to encompass annoyance, anxiety or emotional upset, then
“anything”, no matter how trivial, which would lead to such annoyance, anxiety
or emotional upset would be caught by the provision: a man might be convicted

99. Amnon Rubinstein, Jurisdiction and Illegality: A Study in Public Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1965) at 16.
100. Fraternité des policiers et policières de la MRC des Collines-de-l’Outaouais c Collines-del’Outaouais (MRC des), 2010 QCCA 816 at para 27, 4 Admin LR (5th) 74, Morissette JA
[Fraternité des policiers]. See also Stéphane Beaulac, Handbook on Statutory Interpretation:
General Methodology, Canadian Charter and International Law (Markham: Lexis Nexis, 2008)
at 14-15; JA Corry, “Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes” (1936) 1 UTLJ
286 at 290-91; Hogg, supra note 13 at 163.
101. [1985] 1 SCR 106, SCJ No 6 (QL).
102. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 176(3).
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under the section for failing to take his hat off in church, or failing to keep it on
in synagogue.103

What is striking here is that an appreciation of the factual consequences
of the interpretation of a statutory provision exerted a significant effect on the
Court’s determination of what was ostensibly a legal question. Even the distinction
between “law” and “fact,” which is so intuitively clear, seems to become blurred
upon closer examination.104
Moreover, neither administrative decision makers nor courts employ the ostensibly
neat distinction between law, fact, and mixed law and fact. At the very least, “the three
‘stages’ of the process do not in practice occur consecutively or even separately.”105
Indeed, given that courts do not consciously employ such a rigid reasoning process, “it
would be strange if reviewing courts insisted on the division being rigidly maintained
by administrative tribunals when it is not maintained by superior courts presided over
by highly skilled lawyers.”106 This should come as no surprise:
Perplexing problems may … arise in analysing the nature of the process by which a
tribunal determines whether a factual situation falls within or without the limits of a
category or standard prescribed by a statute or other legal instrument. Every finding by
a tribunal postulates a process of abstraction and inference, which may be conditioned
solely by the adjudicator’s practical experience and knowledge of affairs, or partly or
wholly by his knowledge of legal principle. He hears evidence and, by satisfying himself
as to its reliability, finds what were the “true” facts; it may then be necessary for him to
draw a series of inferences from these primary findings in order to determine what were
the material facts on which he has to base his decision; in order to draw certain of these
inferences correctly he may need to apply his knowledge of legal rules. At what point
does an inference drawn from facts become an inference of law? Is the application of
a statutory norm to the material facts always to be classified as the determination of a
question of law? And where in this spectrum lie questions of policy?107

103. Ibid at para 36.
104. It could be that any application of the ‘consequential analysis’ tool of statutory interpretation
would raise the same questions, but the problem is particularly pressing when a decision
maker has been charged both with finding facts and interpreting legal provisions: It is hardly
a stretch to posit that the meaning given to the statutory provisions will be influenced by the
facts as found in the particular case, and the process of finding them.
105. Emery, supra note 96 at 615. See also Susan L Gratton, “Standing at the Divide: The
Relationship Between Administrative Law and the Charter post-Multani” (2008) 53:3
McGill LJ 477 at 485-87.
106. Rubinstein, supra note 99 at 40.
107. SA De Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th ed by Lord Woolf & Jeffrey Jowell
(London, UK: Sweet and Maxwell, 1995) at 277.

336

(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

Given that confusion is inevitable and explanation is difficult, an analysis based
on ostensibly neat categories of law, fact, and mixed law and fact risks undermining
the autonomy of administrative decision makers. Without explaining its reasoning
process, a court following a categorical approach can characterize a question as one of
law, thereby requiring intrusive judicial review. Neat questions of law, however, do not
arise with sufficient clarity to justify vesting such strong discretion in reviewing courts.108
Previously, the Court was sceptical about an approach that relied on
distinctions between law, fact, and mixed law and fact, holding that “[t]here is no
clear line to be drawn between questions of law and questions of fact, and, in any
event, many determinations involve questions of mixed law and fact.”109 Justice
Iacobucci put the point forcefully in Canada (Director of Investigation and Research,
Competition Act) v Southam Inc:110 “[T]he distinction between law on the one
hand and mixed law and fact on the other is difficult. On occasion, what appears
to be mixed law and fact turns out to be law, or vice versa.”111 No philosophical
revolution has occurred in the years since those observations were made; the
ostensibly neat distinctions remain nebulous. Worse, because of the vague nature
of the distinctions, they are incapable of functioning as a means of allocating
authority between administrative decision makers and reviewing courts. Indeed,
they are an inappropriate means of doing so because they mask reviewing courts’
true reasons for decision: “[D]istinctions between law, fact, and policy, acquire
a concrete content only in relation to specific instances of administrative action,
where they reflect the court’s conclusions about the most appropriate division of
responsibility between court and agency in all the circumstances.”112 Underpinning the
categories developed by the Court are numerous assumptions about the appropriate
allocation of interpretive responsibility. For example, there is the assumption that legal
questions should be placed solely in the domain of courts. But the development and
use of the categories masks these assumptions. That those assumptions may present a
quiet departure from a deferential and substance-based approach should cause concern.

108. See also Heckman, supra note 78 at 77-82. Heckman criticizes the “legal centrism” of the
category of questions of general law and suggests that its scope should be narrowed.
109. Pushpanathan, supra note 24 at para 37. See also Baker, supra note 58 at paras 53-55.
110. Southam, supra note 23.
111. Ibid at para 35.
112. TRS Allan, “Constitutional Dialogue and the Justification of Judicial Review” (2003) 23:4
Oxford J Legal Stud 563 at 570. See also Mark Aronson, “Unreasonableness and Error of
Law” (2001) 24 UNSWLJ 315; GL Peiris, “Jurisdictional Review and Judicial Policy: The
Evolving Mosaic” (1987) 103 Law Q Rev 66 at 94-95.
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B. JURISDICTION113

As Justice Frankfurter once sagely observed, “‘Jurisdiction’ competes with
‘right’ as one of the most deceptive of legal pitfalls.”114 In this section, I equate
jurisdiction with an administrative decision maker’s power to take a decision.
What I am most interested in are situations in which an administrative decision
maker claims or relies on a power, the existence or legitimate exercise of which
is subsequently contested before a reviewing court. A finding adverse to the
administrative decision maker will lead to the conclusion that it committed a
jurisdictional error by acting ultra vires its statutory authority.
The so-called ultra vires doctrine sought to anchor the justification for judicial
review by anchoring it to legislative intent.115 The ultra vires doctrine is associated
with what came to be the orthodox conception of jurisdiction in administrative
law.116 The starting point is that the powers of administrative decision makers are
necessarily limited. As Justice Beetz once explained, “any grant of jurisdiction will
necessarily include limits to the jurisdiction granted.”117 Accordingly, if a statute
provides that a decision maker can do Y only if X is present, then the presence
of X is a pre-condition to the doing of Y. To take a familiar example, a tribunal
granted the power to make findings of discrimination in respect of the letting of
self-contained dwelling units can only make a finding of discrimination (Y) if a
given premises is a self-contained dwelling unit (X).118 Here, the existence of X is a
pre-condition to the doing of Y. Moreover, it can be said that, by conditioning the
doing of Y on the existence of X, the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction
of the administrative decision maker. By policing these limits, a reviewing court
is simply giving effect to legislative intent:
[Jurisdictional facts] were to be distinguished from facts on which findings were
conclusive only by the legislature’s having marked them out as condition-forming
facts; that is statutory language must show that these facts had actually to exist before
the tribunal whose powers were being defined could have conditional jurisdiction.119
113. This section draws heavily on (and revises for a Canadian audience) arguments I first
formulated in Daly, Theory of Deference, supra note 4 at 221-33.
114. Yonkers v United States, 320 US 685 at 695, 64 S Ct 327 (1944).
115. See generally Tremblay, supra note 12.
116. See generally Paul Craig, “Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review” (1998) 57:1
Cambridge LJ 63.
117. Bibeault, supra note 22 at para 118.
118. See Bell, supra note 9. See also R v London (City of ) Rent Tribunal, Ex parte Honig, [1951] 1
KB 641, 1 All ER 195; R (A) v Croydon London Borough Council, [2009] UKSC 8, 1 WLR
2557 [Croydon].
119. DM Gordon, “Conditional or Contingent Jurisdiction of Tribunals” (1960) 1:2 UBC L Rev
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On the orthodox view of the ultra vires doctrine, it falls to the reviewing
court to determine whether the conditions for jurisdiction have been satisfied:
“the fact must exist in the opinion of the reviewing court.”120 Canadian courts
have preferred to label this as the “preliminary question doctrine.”121 They have good
reason for doing so; at its outer limits, the preliminary question doctrine also applies
to any questions of law said to have been interpreted by an administrative
decision maker.122
Unfortunately, no formula has ever been devised for distinguishing X from Y.
S.A. De Smith’s words ring as true today as they did decades ago: “No satisfactory
test has ever been formulated for distinguishing findings which go to jurisdiction
from findings which go to the merits.”123 The problem is that all statutory provisions
can be cast in the following basic form: If X is present, then the decision maker shall
or may Y; if a majority of employees are members of a trade union, the Board may
accredit it. In other words, X and Y are “inextricably interwoven.”124 As with the
ostensibly neat distinctions between law, fact, and mixed law and fact, the effect of
the inevitable uncertainty125 is to leave courts with strong discretion as to when to
intervene: “The risk, of course, is that all a court need do to avoid the deferential
standard of review … is to classify a provision as one that goes to jurisdiction.”126
Their interventions would necessarily be based on considerations external to the
preliminary question doctrine. As one commentator has observed, the preliminary
question doctrine that the Court followed in the mid-twentieth century was
“so malleable as to be capable of justifying the inclusion within its reach of any
question of law or mixed law and fact that a tribunal was called upon to decide
in the exercise of its mandate.”127 The Court’s response was quite sensible, as the
185 at 197 [emphasis added].
120. Hogg, “Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine,” supra note 13 at 210.
121. For a recent example, see Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Nova Scotia (Human Rights
Commission), 2012 SCC 10 at para 34, 1 SCR 364 [Halifax].
122. BC Gould, “Anisminic and Jurisdictional Review” [1970] PL 358.
123. Supra note 107 at 255. See also Jaffe, supra note 97 at 959.
124. Paul Craig, “Jurisdiction, Judicial Control, and Agency Autonomy” in Ian Loveland, ed,
A Special Relationship? American Influences on Public Law in the United Kingdom (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995) 173 at 177.
125. See Craig, Administrative Law, supra note 6 at 441. See similarly William Wade,
“Constitutional and Administrative Aspects of the Anisminic Case” (1969) 85:338 Law Q
Rev 198 at 210-11.
126. National Corn Growers Association v Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 SCR 1324 at para
23, SCJ no 110 (QL), Wilson J, concurring.
127. David Mullan, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Tribunals – Deference to the
Administrative Process: A Recent Phenomenon or a Return to Basics?” (2001) 80 Can Bar
Rev 399 at 423. See also JM Evans, “Developments in Administrative Law: The 1984-1985
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preliminary question doctrine was swallowed up by the standard of review analysis.
Justice Beetz wrote in Union des employés de service, local 298 v Bibeault:128
The concept of the preliminary or collateral question diverts the courts from the real
problem of judicial review: it substitutes the question “Is this a preliminary or collateral
question to the exercise of the tribunal’s power?” for the only question which should be
asked, “Did the legislator intend the question to be within the jurisdiction conferred
on the tribunal?” The chief problem in a case of judicial review is determining the
jurisdiction of the tribunal whose decision is impugned. The courts, including this
Court, have often remarked on the difficulty of the task. I doubt whether it is possible
to state a simple and precise rule for identifying a question of jurisdiction, given the
fluidity of the concept of jurisdiction and the many ways in which jurisdiction is
conferred on administrative tribunals.129

Justice Beetz’s retention of the language of jurisdiction may have preserved
the attraction of the preliminary question doctrine for litigants and judges, but
his development of the standard of review analysis undermined the doctrine.
An entirely new approach was to be taken, pursuant to which a reviewing court
would not parse a decision for jurisdictional errors or a statute for jurisdictional
limitations. Rather than relying on the preliminary question doctrine to classify
questions as jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional, reviewing courts would
attempt to give effect to legislative intent. The development of a competing
approach sounded the death knell for the preliminary question doctrine. The
Court eventually said that the standard of review analysis “must be applied even
to those provisions which appear to limit a tribunal’s jurisdiction.”130 In Crevier
v Québec (Attorney General),131 the Court had held that the Constitution requires
that judicial review be available to keep decision makers within limits prescribed
by legislatures. However, insofar as this could be described as jurisdictional review,
it came to refer to questions which, according to the outcome of the standard
of review analysis, were to be reviewed on a standard of review of correctness.
Jurisdiction, then, became a label to describe the results of the standard of review
analysis and not itself a key component in the analysis132—a label, but one prone
Term” (1986) 8:1 Sup Ct L Rev 1 at 27-28.
128. Supra note 22. Cf. Beetz J’s earlier position in Canada Labour Relations Board, supra note 22
at 441.
129. Bibeault, ibid at paras 120-21.
130. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 301 v Montréal (City), [1997] 1 SCR 793 at para
44, SCJ No 39 (QL), L’Heureux-Dubé J.
131. Supra note 2. For criticism see HW Arthurs, “Protection against Judicial Review” (1983)
43:2 R du B 277.
132. See Pushpanathan, supra note 24 at para 30. See also The Honourable Michel Bastarache,
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to “analytical emptiness.”133 It certainly did not follow from the Court’s logic in
Crevier that the preliminary question doctrine, or anything like it, would have
to be employed by reviewing courts, for all Crevier did was to “entrench ... some
degree of review.”134
The multiplicity of difficulties attendant upon the use of the traditional
conception of jurisdiction can be avoided by requiring a holistic inquiry into
legislative intent. Such an inquiry focuses on the substance of the statutory
provisions at issue. A judge following such an approach does not read a statute with
a formal conception of jurisdictional questions in his or her mind. A reviewing
court’s decision to label a question as jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional should
never fully answer the question of the appropriate degree of deference to accord
because the concept of jurisdiction gives little or no guidance as to legislative
intent. The very genius of the standard of review analysis was to recognize this
flaw and avoid it. The concept of jurisdiction always remains relevant in the sense
that decision makers cannot exercise unlimited power.135 But the boundaries of
jurisdiction can be marked by the concept of unreasonableness; outside those
boundaries, a decision could be struck down as unlawful, thereby securing some
measure of judicial review.
In Public Service Alliance of Canada v Canadian Federal Pilots Association,136
Justice Evans attempted to narrow the category of jurisdictional questions
established by Dunsmuir almost out of existence. In light of the difficulties that

133.

134.

135.
136.

“Modernizing Judicial Review” (2009) 22 Can J Admin L & Prac 227 at 231-34;
Huscroft, supra note 28 at 296-97. But cf. e.g. Chieu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2002 SCC 3 at para 24, 1 SCR 84, Iacobucci J. Iacobucci J evidences, perhaps,
the lure of the traditional conception of jurisdiction: “Administrative bodies generally must
be correct in determining the scope of their delegated mandate, given that they are entirely
the creatures of statute.” He perhaps also evidences the lure of the strict approach taken to
review of jurisdictional determinations made by municipalities. See e.g. United Taxi Drivers’
Fellowship of Southern Alberta v Calgary (City), 2004 SCC 19, 1 SCR 485.
Public Service Alliance of Canada v Canadian Federal Pilots Association, 2009 FCA 223 at
para 40, [2010] 3 FCR 219, Evans JA [Federal Pilots Association]. See also Alberta Teachers’
Association, supra note 56.
Julius H Grey, “Sections 96 to 100: A Defense” (1985) 1 Admin LJ 3 at 11. See also
Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) v Canadian National Railway Co, [1998] 4 FC 506 at
para 11, FCJ No 1164 (QL). Strayer JA writes, “A reasonableness test, even on findings of
jurisdictional fact, should provide adequate judicial control to avoid arbitrary or capricious
determinations in support of the assertion of jurisdiction.”
See Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121, SCJ No 1 (QL).
Supra note 133.
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I have described with the formal conception of jurisdiction, I must agree in
principle with Justice Evans’s admonition that
it is too late in the development of administrative law in Canada for an applicant
to invoke the ghost of jurisdiction past to inveigle the Court into reviewing for
correctness a tribunal’s interpretation of a provision in its enabling statute, without
subjecting it to a standard of review analysis.137

I admire Justice Evans’s evident distaste for the formal conception of
jurisdiction. However, I must respectfully disagree with his conclusion that an
applicant can establish that a decision maker has “exceeded its jurisdiction” only
by demonstrating that the decision maker’s interpretation “was unreasonable.”138
For good or ill, the Court expressly established a category of “true questions of
jurisdiction or vires” in Dunsmuir. However, there are signs that Justice Evans’s
criticisms have had their intended effect. In Alberta Teachers’ Association,139 Justice
Rothstein, for the majority of the Court, indicated openness to the argument that
the category of jurisdictional questions should be abolished entirely.140 Indeed,
the Court has very recently gone so far as to overturn its decision in Bell v Ontario
(Human Rights Commission),141 noting that the whole notion of “preliminary
questions” central to the reasoning in Bell “has long since been abandoned.”142
One hopes the Court will indeed take the step of abolishing the category of
jurisdictional questions, but until it has done so, the formal conception of
jurisdiction is not a ghost.
In summary, reliance on “law” and “jurisdiction” as the cornerstone of
judicial review doctrine will cause Canada’s administrative law superstructure to
shift, bend, and creak. The categories are underpinned by hidden assumptions
that do not support the deferential approach advocated by the Court. These
assumptions are that reviewing courts should be able to intervene to correct
jurisdictional errors and errors in answering general questions of law. However,
no normative basis has been offered in Dunsmuir or other recent decisions in
support of such an interventionist stance.143 Simply classifying questions as ones
of law or jurisdiction is insufficient and masks rather than explains the content
137. Ibid at 52. See also Canada (Attorney General) v Public Service Alliance of Canada, 2011 FCA
257 at para 30, FCJ No 1325 (QL).
138. Federal Pilots Association, supra note 133 at para 50.
139. Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 56.
140. Ibid at para 42.
141. Supra note 9.
142. Halifax, supra note 121.
143. The impossibility of providing such normative basis is discussed elsewhere. See Daly, Theory
of Deference, supra note 4, ch 6.
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of the concepts. Such shaky foundations do not augur well for an attempt to
construct a relationship between courts and administrative decision makers that
serves the needs of judicial review in the modern state.

V. ARE THE CATEGORIES COHERENT?
Quite apart from the difficulties identified in the previous section, the categories
themselves are both over- and under-inclusive. I contend that this is a significant
problem with the categorical approach. If a categorical approach is to be adopted,
it is important that the categories are appropriately tailored. It is ever more important given the Court’s equivocation as to what is required to move a particular
decision out of one category and into another.
A. OVER-INCLUSIVENESS
1.

QUESTIONS OF LAW IN HOME STATUTE

According deference to decision makers’ interpretations of their home statutes
carries significant appeal. Relative to a reviewing court staffed by generalists, a
specialist administrative decision maker will often be better able to develop an
interpretation of law that coheres with the principles and policies underpinning
the statute.But to state as a rule that such interpretations should be reviewed on a
reasonableness standard goes too far.144
There may be questions relating to the decision maker’s home statute that
are general in nature and thus not appropriate candidates for deference. As
Justice Cromwell pointedly observed in Alberta Teachers’ Association,145 there may
be questions relating to the home statute which should be subject to review for
correctness: “[T]here are legal questions in ‘home’ statutes whose resolution the
legislature did not intend to leave to the tribunal; indeed, it is hard to imagine
where else the limits of a tribunal’s delegated power are more likely to be set out.”146
144. Indeed, it is not clear that one can take the Court literally on this point. See Alliance
Pipeline, supra note 59 at para 85. As Deschamps J observed in Alliance Pipeline, in
respect of the language used in Dunsmuir, “the language could be read broadly to capture
any instance when the administrative decision-maker is interpreting its home statute;
however, this interpretation does not sit well with any of the previous grounds that this
Court has advanced for according deference.” Binnie J has expressed similar concerns. See
his concurring reasons in Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 56 at paras 48, 81-83.
Ultimately, he seemed to provoke the majority of the Court into accepting his position that
deference to interpretations of home statutes should not be automatic.
145. Supra note 56.
146. Ibid at para 99.
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The approach of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (Attorney General)
v Mowat147 is instructive (though not authoritative in its result, as the Court took
a different view on appeal in Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v
Canada (Attorney General)).148 Here, the question was whether the Canadian
Human Rights Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) had the power to award legal costs to
a successful complainant under its authority to make awards in respect of “any
expenses incurred by the victim as a result of the discriminatory practice.”149 The
Tribunal concluded that it had such power. On review by the Federal Court, a
standard of reasonableness was applied to the Tribunal’s interpretation. However,
the Federal Court of Appeal applied a standard of correctness. Justice LaydenStevenson held that the question at issue had no factual component and required
no human rights expertise; rather, the Tribunal had to determine a “pure question
of law, specifically, one that determines the bounds of its authority,” in respect of
which it had “no institutional or experiential advantage over the Court and [was] no
better positioned than the Court.”150 Although the Court took a different view of the
appropriate standard of review in the circumstances,151 the general approach seems
analytically sound and may well find adherents in future cases.152
Moreover, as Justice Deschamps pointed out in her concurring reasons in
Alliance Pipeline, the decision maker might not necessarily have more expertise than
the reviewing court relative to the question at issue:
Such a position is purely formalistic and loses sight of the rationale for according
deference to an interpretation of the home statute that has developed in the
jurisprudence including Dunsmuir, namely, that the legislature has manifested an
intent to draw on the relative expertise or experience of the administrative body to
resolve the interpretative issues before it. Such intent cannot simply be presumed
from the creation of an administrative body by the legislature. Rather, courts should
look to the jurisprudence or to the enabling statute to determine whether it is
established in a satisfactory manner that the decision-maker actually has a particular
familiarity—or put another way, particular expertise or experience relative to a
court—with respect to interpreting its home statute.153

To develop a formal category of decisions to which reasonableness review
applies is to disregard the substance of the individual decisions said to fall
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

2009 FCA 309, [2010] 4 FCR 579 [Mowat].
Supra note 59.
Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, ss 53(2)(c-d).
Mowat, supra note 147 at paras 43-44.
The court purported to apply the categorical approach in reaching this conclusion but in
reality it relied on the standard of review analysis factors.
152. See e.g. Martinez-Caro v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 640, FCJ No 881 (QL).
153. Alliance Pipeline, supra note 59 at para 100.
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within the category. Moreover, one might observe, just because a decision maker
has expertise, it does not follow that the expertise was actually applied to the
decision in question;154 if it was, a more deferential standard of review will be
appropriate.155 A reviewing court following a holistic approach, such as the
standard of review analysis, can be alive to the possibility that expertise was not
applied in a particular case. A reviewing court conducting a formalistic analysis
of whether a decision falls into a particular category cannot be so alive. Justice
Deschamps’s concerns are well-founded.
2.

QUESTIONS OF FACT AND OF MIXED LAW AND FACT

The same objections apply to the categories of questions of fact as well as
mixed law and fact. It is overwhelmingly likely that reasonableness will be the
appropriate standard of review of such decisions. The Court has been clear
that factual determinations “command a high degree of deference.”156 Indeed,
traditionally “the courts have been very slow to accept as a matter of theory or
policy that ‘pure’ errors of fact should be open to supervision.”157 Administrators’
closeness to and familiarity with factual matters within their bailiwick, allied to
the fear of floodgates being burst open by waves of applications for review of
contentious factual matters, probably explain this judicial reticence.
However, there may be factual determinations in respect of which a
reviewing court would be as well or even better placed to give the best answer. A
recent English example may be of assistance. In R (A) v Croydon London Borough
Council,158 the question was whether a local authority or a court should decide
if an individual is a “child” for the purposes of section 20(1) of the Children Act
1989.159 This legislation confers numerous powers and imposes numerous duties
on the courts and local authorities, contingent upon a finding that a person is a
child. But the question of who is a “child” can be difficult to answer, particularly

154. See generally Lorne Sossin, “Empty Ritual, Mechanical Exercise or the Discipline of
Difference? Revisiting the Standard of Review in Administrative Law” (2003) 27:4
Advocates’ Q 478.
155. This is analogous to cases in which a decision maker’s expertise is simply not relevant to a
question it has attempted to answer. See e.g. Elgie v Alberta (Workers’ Compensation, Appeals
Commission), 2009 ABCA 277 at paras 32, 34, 311 DLR (4th) 503.
156. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 46, [2009] 1 SCR 339 [Khosa].
157. Christopher Forsyth & Emma Dring, “The Final Frontier: The Emergence of Material Error of
Fact as a Ground of Judicial Review” in Christopher Forsyth et al, eds, Effective Judicial Review:
A Cornerstone of Good Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 245 at 249.
158. Supra note 118.
159. (UK), 1989, c 41.
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in situations where the circumstances of an individual’s birth have, for whatever
reason, not been adequately documented. Section 20(1) obliges local authorities
to provide accommodation for “any child in need within their area.”160 The local
authority argued that the judgment of “need” must be an evaluative one and that
an appropriate judgment could be made only by the local authority’s staff, who
possessed the relevant expertise. On this view, judicial review would be available,
but the primary decision would be for the local authority. This argument did not
find favour with Lady Hale, who instead drew a distinction between the objective
factual question of “what is a child” and the evaluative factual question of “what is
a child in need”:
The arguments advanced by [the local authority] might have to provide an answer
in cases where Parliament has not made its intentions plain. But in this case it
appears to me that Parliament has done just that. In section 20(1) a clear distinction
is drawn between the question whether there is a “child in need within their area”
and the question whether it appears to the local authority that the child requires
accommodation for one of the listed reasons. In section 17(10) a clear distinction is
drawn between whether the person is a “child” and whether that child is to be “taken
to be” in need within the meaning of the Act. “Taken to be” imports an element
of judgment ... which Parliament may well have intended to be left to the local
authority rather than the courts.161

It is striking that Lady Hale was so exercised by the intricacies of the statutory
regime. She parsed the statute in a search for the intention of the legislature,
not for jurisdictional limitations. Equally striking was her subsequent insistence
that questions of relative expertise were relevant to determining legislative
intent. Lady Hale acknowledged that the question of whether an individual
was a “child” or not might often be a difficult one, but held that the courts are
sufficiently adept at answering such questions. What is true of determining an
individual’s age “is true of many questions of fact which regularly come before
the courts. That does not prevent them from being questions for the courts rather
than for other kinds of decision makers.”162 Deference to administrative decision
makers on questions of fact will not, on Lady Hale’s approach, automatically
be appropriate. An analysis of the statutory scheme and the relative expertise
of the bodies involved will be necessary before a conclusion can be reached on
the allocation of authority.

160. Ibid, s 20(1).
161. Croydon, supra note 118 at 28.
162. Ibid at 27.
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A conclusion like the one reached by the UK Supreme Court in Croydon
may be rare, but in principle, it can occur. If, in principle, such an outcome can
occur in respect of factual determinations, where deference is most likely to be
appropriate, then it is a fortiori capable of occurring in respect of determinations
of mixed fact and law. In short, a standard of review of reasonableness will not
always be appropriate.
3.

GENERAL QUESTIONS OF LAW

On the correctness side of the post-Dunsmuir ledger, the categories are also overinclusive. In respect of general questions of law, a decision maker may be more
expert than a reviewing court—especially given the expansion of that category
in Alliance Pipeline.163 For example, the question at issue in Metropolitan Life—
what constituted membership of a trade union—could easily be said to be a
question of general law that is of central importance to the legal system.164 The
phrase “members of a trade union” appears in federal legislation and in numerous
provincial statutes.165
However, a large part of the reason that Metropolitan Life is now treated with
such disdain166 is that this is precisely the sort of question on which a labour relations
board could easily be said to have more expertise than a generalist reviewing court.167
First, a labour relations board will address such questions on a regular basis and,
being staffed by experts in the field, will have an advantage relative to a court in
determining which approach to take to the question of membership to best achieve
its statutory objectives. Second, different labour relations boards can justifiably take
different approaches to the question of membership; it is not self-evident that the
same conditions will be present in both Alberta and Newfoundland, and different
policies may be required to respond to the complexities present in different
jurisdictions. Third, as practices in the labour relations community change, it may
be prudent for labour relations boards to change their policies, perhaps with input
from employer and employee representatives, a possibility foreclosed by national
resolution of the question of membership.
163. See text accompanying supra note 74.
164. Equally, of course, it could be said to be an interpretation of a home statute; as I will
demonstrate below, there will often be such conflict between the categories.
165. See e.g. Trade Unions Act, RSC 1985, c T-14, ss 4(1)(a), 6; Labour Relations Act, RSNL 1990,
c L-1, ss 70(7)(b), 70(8), 128(1); Labour Relations Code, RSA 2000, c L-1, ss 29(1), 85(a),
92(3), 151(d), 151(e), 202(1), 203.
166. See text accompanying supra note 81.
167. Paul C Weiler, “The ‘Slippery Slope’ of Judicial Intervention: The Supreme Court and
Canadian Labour Relations 1950-1970” (1971) 9:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 2-4.
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These considerations might be unique to the labour relations context, but
similar ones can be expected to arise in other areas.168 If the approach taken in
Metropolitan Life is indeed now considered to be bad law, if not “pure nonsense,”169
it is troubling that the Court’s categorization efforts threaten to usher it back into
Canadian judicial review doctrine. Some of these concerns are assuaged by the
attitude that the Court took in Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc v Manitoba
Association of Health Care Professionals170 to the application of the common law
concept of estoppel by a labour arbitrator. In this case, the Court held that a
reasonableness standard was appropriate. However, Justice Fish’s reasoning was
heavily contingent on the characteristics of the labour arbitrator,171 which opens
up the unhappy prospect that the “pure nonsense” represented by Metropolitan
Life might be acceptable outside the labour relations context.
4.

JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS

The scope of the category of true questions of jurisdiction, or vires, is uncertain.
In Dunsmuir, Justices Bastarache and LeBel insisted—repeating Chief Justice
Dickson’s admonition in New Brunswick Liquor—that “[t]hese questions will
be narrow … reviewing judges must not brand as jurisdictional issues that are
doubtfully so.”172 In Alberta Teachers’ Association173 Justice Rothstein suggested
that, at best, such questions would be “exceptional.”174 Nevertheless, even a
narrow category of “true” questions has the potential to include too many
administrative decisions.
A decision maker’s expertise may often be relevant in answering jurisdictional
questions. It is likely that a decision maker will be more familiar than a reviewing
court with the contours of the relevant regulatory domain and the areas in which
the decision maker could usefully and appropriately exercise its powers.175 Thus,
it was shrewd of Justice Abella to advise in Council of Canadians with Disabilities
v VIA Rail Canada176 that courts should “refrain from overlooking the expertise
168. See e.g. New Brunswick (Human Rights Commission) v Potash Corp of Saskatchewan Inc, 2006
NBCA 74 at para 61, 271 DLR (4th) 483.
169. Supra note 167 at 32.
170. Supra note 59.
171. Ibid at paras 45-53.
172. Dunsmuir, supra note 21 at para 59. See similarly Khosa, supra note 156 at para 45.
173. Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 56.
174. Ibid at para 39.
175. See e.g. Quincy M Crawford “Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations that Delimit the
Scope of the Agency’s Jurisdiction” (1994) 61:3 U Chicago L Rev 957 at 981.
176. 2007 SCC 15, 1 SCR 650.

348

(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

a tribunal may bring to the exercise of interpreting its enabling legislation and
defining the scope of its statutory authority.”177
Such a nuanced method is ruled out by the categorical approach. Again, one
of the categories turns out to be over-inclusive. However, at least here the bell
may be tolling for the category of true questions of jurisdiction or vires, judging
by the Court’s treatment of it in Alberta Teachers’ Association.178 If this category is
indeed jettisoned, its over-inclusiveness will go with it.
B. UNDER-INCLUSIVENESS

The categories are also under-inclusive in important respects. Deference for a
wider range of administrative decisions than that envisaged by the categories is
appropriate. Most obviously, an administrative decision maker may be better able
to resolve questions of general law and jurisdictional questions than a reviewing
court would be. This implies that limiting the categories of decision to which
deference should be accorded to factual questions, questions of mixed fact and
law, and interpretations of a decision maker’s home statute is inappropriate.
Similarly, deference may also be appropriate regarding questions that appear to
be jurisdictional in nature. Simply put, the categories are under-inclusive because
they do not capture the full range of decisions on which a standard of review of
reasonableness would be appropriate.

VI. CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CATEGORIES179
It follows from the argument up to this point that there is a serious potential
for conflict between the categories. The Court’s recent decisions provide ample
demonstration that this potential for conflict has been realized.
Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney
General),180 discussed above, provides a first example. Recall that the Federal
Court of Appeal held that the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal was not entitled
to deference even though it was interpreting a provision in its home statute,
because the question of whether the Tribunal had the power to award costs was a
question of general law. But following the categorical approach, it is difficult to

177. Ibid at para 89 [emphasis added].
178. Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 56.
179. The argument in this section draws in part on the more complete descriptions of the cases
provided in Paul Daly, “Dunsmuir’s Flaws Exposed: Recent Decisions on Standard of Review”
(2012) 58:2 McGill LJ 1.
180. Supra note 59.
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see how the question at issue should be categorized. On the one hand, it clearly
relates to an interpretation of the decision maker’s home statute. But on the other
hand, it could be categorized as a question of general law: Many decision makers
would be interested in the scope of their authority to award costs to successful
claimants or participants.181
At the Supreme Court of Canada, the conflict between the categories was
ultimately resolved by reference to factors external to the categories. For the Court,
Justices LeBel and Cromwell held that determining whether legal costs could
be awarded in such circumstances fell “within the core function and expertise”
of the Tribunal182 because it was “inextricably intertwined with the Tribunal’s
mandate and expertise to make factual findings relating to discrimination.”183
They noted that the Tribunal was in a good position to assess the need to award
costs in particular cases that came before it.184 Finally, they emphasized that the
question required a fact-sensitive inquiry.185 In other words, to determine the
appropriate standard of review, Justices LeBel and Cromwell employed factors
from the standard of review analysis: expertise, the factual nature of the question,
and the purpose of the statutory provision in question.186
A second example is Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc v Manitoba
Association of Health Care Professionals.187 At issue here was a labour arbitrator’s
interpretation of a collective agreement. The union had abided for many years by
the employer’s interpretation of a provision relating to eligibility for additional
paid leave but eventually grieved the interpretation. The arbitrator decided that
the employer’s interpretation was incorrect, but that the union, by virtue of its
many years of acquiescence, was estopped from challenging it. The courts below
were split on the appropriate standard of review. On the one hand, as the Manitoba
Court of Appeal held, estoppel is a common law principle. It is a question of
general law beyond the expertise of labour arbitrators and appropriately subject
to judicial oversight on a correctness standard.188 On the other hand, applying a
concept such as estoppel in the particular context of labour relations unavoidably
See e.g. Kelly v Alberta (Energy Resources Conservation Board), 2012 ABCA 19, Alta LR (5th) 391.
Canadian Human Rights Commission, supra note 59 at para 25.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 26.
See similarly Canada (Attorney General) v Tipple, 2011 FC 762 at paras 27-35, 91 CCEL
(3d) 132.
187. Supra note 59.
188. Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals v Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc,
2010 MBCA 55 at para 46, 255 Man R (2d) 93.

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
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raises interlocking issues of fact and policy, features that support the decision of
the judge at first instance to apply a standard of review of reasonableness.189
The Court was unanimous in concluding that a standard of reasonableness
ought to apply. The unique position of labour arbitrators was central to the
conclusion. Justice Fish noted that labour arbitrators operate under broad
statutory and contractual mandates. This breadth is necessary to allow them to
fulfill the difficult role of mediating between management and labour in order to
foster industrial peace. The generosity of their mandates is also appropriate given
their expertise in the field of labour relations. Finally, Justice Fish emphasized
that labour arbitrators are uniquely well positioned to respond to the exigencies
of the employer-employee relationship.190 Expertise and statutory purpose—
factors drawn from the standard of review analysis—were crucial to Justice Fish’s
conclusion that a standard of review of reasonableness should be applied. Two
other factors external to the categorical approach were also relevant: the extent
of the labour arbitrator’s statutory mandate191 and the complexity of the problem
underlying the decision in issue.
In Alberta Teachers’ Association,192 the issue was whether the decision maker
had exercised a power before the expiry of a ninety-day deadline established by
its home statute. Both of the lower courts accepted that this was a jurisdictional
question to which the decision maker was obliged to give a correct answer.193 The
Supreme Court of Canada applied a standard of review of reasonableness on the
basis that the decision maker was interpreting its home statute and thus entitled
to deference.
For the majority of the Court, Justice Rothstein held that the decision under
review did not fall into any of the correctness categories.194 The appropriate
category was that of a decision interpreting the decision maker’s home statute,
189. Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals v Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc,
2009 MBQB 213 at para 11-13, 243 Man R (2d) 281. See further Heckman, supra note 78
at 73-77.
190. Nor-Man, supra note 59 at 42-53.
191. See also Telfer v Canada (Revenue Agency), 2009 FCA 23 at para 40, 4 CTC 123.
192. Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 56.
193. [2008] 21 Alta LR (5th) 24, 1 Admin LR (5th) 85; 2010 ABCA 26 at paras 37-40, 316 DLR
(4th) 117 (aff’d).
194. Recall that Rothstein J expressed significant skepticism about the category of “true
questions of jurisdiction or vires,” announcing himself unable to provide a definition. See
text accompanying supra notes 137-140. Tellingly, he did not explain why the question at
issue was not a jurisdictional question. Thus only the artful avoidance of a conflict between
classifying the relevant issue as a jurisdictional question or an interpretation of a home statute
prevented the flaws of the categorical approach from being even more cruelly exposed.
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which attracted a reasonableness standard. However, in determining that the
question was not one of general law, Justice Rothstein noted that the decision
was “squarely” within the “specialized expertise” of the decision maker.195 He also
identified as important the decision maker’s “significant familiarity” with an issue
“specific” to its home statute.196 Finally, he described the decision maker’s role as
centering upon balancing the rights of individuals to privacy against organizations’
needs to disclose information in certain circumstances, necessitating a complex
process of keeping the interests of the parties in alignment.197 The decision on the
appropriate standard of review was saturated with references to the standard of
review analysis factors.
It is clear then that in its recent decisions on standard of review the Court
has relied partly on the standard of review analysis factors198 and partly on other
factors such as the breadth of the decision maker’s mandate and the complexity of
the subject matter of the decision. Provincial courts are not immune.199 Using the
standard of review analysis in this way might cohere with the Court’s approach
in Dunsmuir, which marginalized the standard of review analysis but did not
push it entirely out of the judicial review framework. Thus, despite having been
marginalized, the standard of review analysis could yet play an important role
in ensuring that decisions are assigned to the appropriate categories. Of course,
if the standard of review analysis were to play such a role, the utility of the
categorical approach would be called into serious question since the standard
of review analysis would be doing the heavy lifting by placing the decisions in
the appropriate silo. Why bother at all, then, with a formal approach that lacks
internal coherence and is not capable of resolving difficult cases? That the Court
has not yet fully thought through its new approach is surely cause for lament. For
now, the obvious potential for conflict between the categories suggests that, far
from laying confusion to rest, the Court has merely relocated it. Any suggestion
that categorization will lead to a more straightforward body of judicial review law
looks dubious at best and badly mistaken at worst.
Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 56 at para 32.
Ibid.
Ibid.
For some accurate prognostication, see Ron Goltz, “‘Patent Unreasonableness is Dead. And
We Have Killed It.’ A Critique of the Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision in Dunsmuir”
(2008) 46:1 Alta L Rev 253.
199. See e.g. Mellor v Saskatchewan (Workers’ Compensation Board), 2012 SKCA 10 at para 20, 385
Sask R 210. The court relied heavily on expertise. See also Syndicat du personnel technique,
supra note 76 at paras 71-72. The court relied on complexity, purpose of the statutory
provisions, and expertise.
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VII. CATEGORIES AND CONTEXT
An important point about the new standard of review of reasonableness follows
from the foregoing discussion. Given that the aim of Dunsmuir and its confrères
seems to be to replace the standard of review analysis with a new categorical
analysis, it is worth assessing the implications of this change for the second stage
of the standard of review analysis. As I will suggest, the switch to a categorical
approach may require the Court to answer a question left tantalizingly unresolved
by Dunsmuir.
Having had regard in Dunsmuir to the difficulties in applying a tripartite
standard of review, the majority of the Court felt compelled to “conclude that
the two variants of reasonableness review should be collapsed into a single form
of ‘reasonableness’ review.”200 The correctness standard was untouched, but a
new, unified standard of reasonableness was announced by Justices Bastarache
and LeBel. Reasonableness, they explained, is concerned with justification,
transparency, and intelligibility within the decision-making process as well as with
whether the decision falls within a range of acceptable and rational solutions.201
Justice Binnie suggested in his concurring reasons in Dunsmuir that the unified
standard of reasonableness might contain degrees of deference within it, given
that “different administrative decisions command different degrees of deference,
depending on who is deciding what.”202 Later, speaking for the majority of the
Court in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa,203 Justice Binnie was
less explicit: “Reasonableness is a single standard that takes its colour from the
context.”204
The emphasis on the importance of context is sensible as a matter of logic;
the unified reasonableness standard in Dunsmuir cannot apply itself. The range
of outcomes must be determined by reference to some starting point, as must
the concrete content of abstract concepts, such as justification, transparency, and
intelligibility. The problem with the Khosa refinement, however, is that it leaves
unclear what “context” is. The dangers attendant upon this lack of clarity are
exemplified by the judgment of Justice Rouleau in Mills v Ontario (Workplace
Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal):205
200. Dunsmuir, supra note 21 at para 45.
201. Ibid at para 47.
202. Ibid at para 135. See also Fraternité des policiers, supra note 100 at paras 13-14; Globalive,
supra note 58 at para 32.
203. Supra note 156.
204. Ibid at para 59.
205. 2008 ONCA 436, 168 ACWS (3d) 679.
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Applying the reasonableness standard will now require a contextual approach to
deference where factors such as the decision-making process, the type and expertise
of the decision-maker, as well as the nature and complexity of the decision will be
taken into account. Where, for example, the decision-maker is a minister of the
Crown and the decision is one of public policy, the range of decisions that will fall
within the ambit of reasonableness is very broad. In contrast, where there is no real
dispute on the facts and the tribunal need only determine whether an individual
breached a provision of its constituent statute, the range of reasonable outcomes is,
perforce, much narrower.206

At no point does Justice Rouleau explain from whence springs his reliance on
the status of the decision maker, whether the decision is a “public policy” decision
or whether there is “no real dispute” on the facts. There may be something to
be said for a departure from the four factors relied on in the standard of review
analysis, but it ought to be stated explicitly. For now, the risk created by an openended definition of reasonableness that “takes its colour from the context”207 is
that a potentially unlimited number of factors might be taken into account by
reviewing courts in their determination of context.
It seems to me that there are really only two possible means of preventing
the judicial determination of context from sliding into a morass of multiple
considerations, the significance of which changes from one case to the next.208 One
possibility is that the severity of the error complained of defines the context. The
more serious the error or errors made by the decision maker, the more work the
decision maker will have to do to convince the reviewing court that the decision
was, nonetheless, reasonable. To put it another way, the more severe the error,
the greater the burden on the decision maker to demonstrate that the decision
was within the range of reasonable outcomes and to show the justification,
transparency, and intelligibility of the process by which it was taken. Yet this
approach was ruled out by the Court in Dunsmuir when it jettisoned the patent
unreasonableness standard. In the end, a focus on severity will inevitably prove
unavailing. To say that a decision is “clearly irrational” rather than “irrational” is
“surely a tautology,”209 and a statement that an error is ‘very severe’ rather than
206. Ibid at para 22.
207. Khosa, supra note 156 at para 59.
208. For an extreme example, see Pharmascience Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FCA 258 at
para 4, 68 CPR (4th) 459. See also Catalyst, supra note 58 at paras 17, 21, 24. In Catalyst, the
Court apparently announced a reasonableness standard that is unique to review of municipal
by-laws, a stance it was seemingly pushed into adopting by a variety of contextual factors.
209. David J Mullan, “Recent Developments in Standard of Review” in Taking the Tribunal
to Court: A Practical Guide for Administrative Law Practitioners (Ontario: Canadian Bar
Association, 2000) at 25.
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‘severe simpliciter’ has the same tautological quality. As Justice LeBel argued in an
influential set of concurring reasons:
There seems to me to be no qualitative basis on which to differentiate effectively
between these various characterizations of a rationality analysis; how, for instance,
would a decision that is not “tenably supported” (and is thus “merely” unreasonable)
differ from a decision that is not “rationally supported” (and is thus patently
unreasonable)?210

Justice Bastarache subsequently made the same point extra-judicially: “Much
like being somewhat pregnant, one cannot be somewhat unreasonable.”211 If the
context for the purposes of a reasonableness analysis is composed, to any degree,
of the severity of the error complained of, it runs into the difficulties identified
by Justices Bastarache and LeBel in Dunsmuir.212
The second possibility is that context is determined by the factors in the
standard of review analysis.213 For example, according to David Mullan’s
interpretation of Justice Binnie, “[U]nder the umbrella of unreasonableness review,
questions of fact should be approached with particular care and deference.”214
The British Columbia Court of Appeal has suggested that the range of acceptable
outcomes will be “dictated by the nature of the question.”215 Expertise, statutory
purpose, and the presence or absence of privative or appeal clauses could also
contribute to the relevant context, making it more or less deferential. The irony
of shooing the standard of review analysis out the front door while allowing it to
skulk in through the back door is striking. But this approach suggests that the
Court’s attempts to marginalize the standard of review analysis are doomed to
failure. Something must determine the context for the application of the unified
reasonableness standard, and the standard of review analysis (or some variant
thereon) seems the most plausible candidate. In the wake of Dunsmuir, the old
standard of review factors seem to be capable of exercising an influence—from
the intensive care unit, if not from beyond the grave. But if that is the case, the
210. Toronto (City) v Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), Local 79, 2003 SCC 63 at para
107, 3 SCR 77.
211. Bastarache, supra note 132 at 235.
212. Dunsmuir, supra note 21 at paras 40-42.
213. Gerald P Heckman, “Substantive Review in Appellate Courts since Dunsmuir” (2009) 47:4
Osgoode Hall LJ 751 at 778-79.
214. David Mullan, “Proportionality – a Proportionate Response to an Emerging Crisis in
Canadian Judicial Review Law?” (2010) NZL Rev 233 at 248. Binnie J was explicit about
this in his concurring reasons in Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 56 at paras 85-89.
215. Teamsters Local Union No 31 v Shadow Lines Transportation Group, 2009 BCCA 130 at para
94, 308 DLR (4th) 90, Ryan JA.
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utility of the categorical approach is further reduced, quite apart from its own
inherent flaws and internal contradictions.

VIII.

CONCLUSION: FORM OR SUBSTANCE?

I have demonstrated numerous shortcomings of the categorical approach
advocated by the Court. The development of these particular categories is
misguided, relying on dubious abstract concepts and flawed, hidden assumptions.
The categories are unclear. They are both over- and under-inclusive. They conflict
with one another. They may not even help the Court to achieve its purported aim
of marginalizing the standard of review analysis.
More generally, the categorical approach represents the unfortunate triumph
of form over substance. By form, I mean the development of conceptual categories
into which decisions must be placed without regard to whether the achievement
of the substantive ends intended by the development of the categories are actually
furthered by placing a particular decision in a category. By substance, I mean
paying attention to the eccentricities of the individual decision and the statutory
provisions pursuant to which it was made.216 For present purposes, I treat the
standard of review analysis as an example of a substantive approach. I do not
endorse the standard of review analysis—far from it. I examine the flaws in the
standard of review analysis elsewhere, in the course of developing an alternative
approach.217 But compared to the categorical approach, the standard of review
analysis is a superior metric in its substantive and deferential orientation. Only
against the frailties of the formalistic, categorical approach championed by the
Court can the strengths of a more substantive approach be properly appreciated.
My discussion of the approach recently pursued by the Court prompts four
general observations. The first three relate to the triumph of form over substance;
the last relates to the possible shift from the Court’s previously deferential posture.
216. See PS Atiyah & Robert S Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987) at 2-5. The authors suggest the distinction between form and
substance. A substantive reason “may be defined as a moral, economic, political, institutional,
or other social consideration” whereas a formal reason “is a legally authoritative reason on
which judges and others are empowered or required to base a decision or action, and such a
reason usually excludes from consideration, overrides, or at least reduces the weight of, any
countervailing substantive reasoning arising at the point of decision or action.”
217. Daly, A Theory of Deference, supra note 4. I do not argue explicitly for a substantive as
opposed to formal approach. Indeed, I suggest therein that my own approach is neither
fish nor fowl, at least in terms of the traditional distinction between form and substance in
administrative law.
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First, the standard of review analysis largely respects the traditional view of
courts as agents of the legislature, with a duty to give effect to legislative intent
(while at the same time ensuring that the legislature had remained within its
constitutional boundaries). This is not legislative intent in any literal or formalistic
sense, but in the sense once described by Lord Reid: Courts should seek “the
meaning of the words which Parliament used.”218 To prefer a categorical approach
is to subjugate legislative intent to autonomous judicial development of categories
of review. There is precedent for this approach since it is how judicial review has
traditionally developed in the Commonwealth. But one of the great advances
made by Canadian courts in developing the standard of review analysis was to
take legislative enactments seriously. No longer was “legislative intent” treated as
a purely formalistic incantation, an empty vessel into which courts could pour
their desired judicial review doctrine. Rather, it was treated as providing guidance
to courts as to how best to shape the law of judicial review.
Second, the standard of review analysis is substantive and contextual in
nature. Its application has forced reviewing courts to confront the nature of the
statutory scheme, the nature of the relationship between the particular decision
and the relative expertise of the decision maker, and the nature of the particular
question presented for review. Perhaps it was too much to expect reviewing courts
to abide by this framework. Too long a sacrifice may, after all, make a stone of the
heart. From the perspective of an overworked judge struggling to clear a docket,
the categorical approach has an appeal that the standard of review analysis
cannot hope to match. But as I have demonstrated, that appeal is superficial.
The categorical approach cannot hope to capture the nuances of the relationship
between reviewing court, legislature, and decision maker. If reviewing courts
want to be serious about giving effect to legislative intent, or, at the very least,
according due weight to legislative enactments, there is no substitute for grappling
with the relevant statutory provisions.
Third, the standard of review analysis had a justificatory value. A reviewing
court grappling with the standard of review had to explain its choice of standard.
Perhaps it was too much to hope for a fully transparent explanation in all cases, but
the standard of review analysis at least pushed reviewing courts in the direction
of clear public pronouncements. By contrast, the categorical approach makes it
too easy for reviewing courts simply to pick a category into which a decision falls
with scant explanation as to why it does so. Viewed from the perspective of one
who values transparency in judicial decision making, the (apparent) demise of
the standard of review analysis is to be lamented.
218. Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG, [1975] AC 591 at
613, 2 WLR 513 (HL).
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Fourth, requiring reviewing courts to perform a standard of review analysis
in all cases gave effect to a general policy of judicial deference. A reviewing
court bent on applying a standard of review of correctness would have to jump
through all the hoops of the standard of review analysis before doing so. Indeed,
this exercise might have prompted many a reviewing court to reconsider its
initial preference for a correctness standard. Now, however, the advent of the
categorical approach makes it much easier for a reviewing court to avoid being
deferential. As I have demonstrated, categorization will often be contestable, but
the courts have identified no criteria to guide the choice between the categories.
A reviewing court minded to apply a correctness standard can simply choose one
of the categories to which a standard of review of correctness applies. The barriers
between a decision maker and a non-deferential court erected by the standard of
review analysis have been torn down by Dunsmuir and the Court’s subsequent
decisions.
Nonetheless, there are encouraging signs. The Court has recently leaned
towards review on a standard of reasonableness on the contentious questions that
have come before it.219 Moreover, in Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v
Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board),220 the Court made clear that concern
about the erosion of deference motivated it to treat the adequacy of reasons as going
to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a decision, rather than to procedural
fairness. Alleged shortcomings in the adequacy of reasons are not to be reviewed
on a standard of correctness.221 In light of this decision, and that of the majority of
the Court in Alberta Teachers’ Association, one lower court judge has suggested that,
in effect, “the Supreme Court has told reviewing Courts to ‘back off’, at least in
reviewing an administrative body’s interpretation of its home statute, closely related
statutes, and frequently encountered common law principle.”222 Moving back in
the direction of a substantive approach to judicial review would cohere with these
apparent tendencies towards deference. The Court ought to do so.
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